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Abstract
Paul Busch has emphasized on various occasions the importance
for physics of going beyond a merely instrumentalist view of quantum
mechanics. Even if we cannot be sure that any particular realist in-
terpretation describes the world as it actually is, the investigation of
possible realist interpretations helps us to develop new physical ideas
and better intuitions about the nature of physical objects at the mi-
cro level. In this spirit, Paul Busch himself pioneered the concept of
“unsharp quantum reality”, according to which there is an objective
non-classical indeterminacy—a lack of sharpness—in the properties of
individual quantum systems.
We concur with Busch’s motivation for investigating realist inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics and with his willingness to move
away from classical intuitions. In this article we try to take some fur-
ther steps on this road. In particular, we pay attention to a number of
prima facie implausible and counter-intuitive aspects of realist inter-
pretations of unitary quantum mechanics. We shall argue that from a
realist viewpoint, quantum contextuality naturally leads to “perspec-
tivalism” with respect to properties of spatially extended quantum
systems, and that this perspectivalism is important for making rela-
tivistic covariance possible.
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1 Introduction
I met Paul Busch for the first time during the 1985 Symposium on the Foun-
dations of Modern Physics in Joensuu, Finland. On that occasion Paul gave
a talk on “Elements of unsharp reality in the EPR experiment” [2], in which
he explained ideas of a research program on which he had embarked not long
before [1] and to which he would keep returning in his later work.
The Joensuu paper starts from the observation that in any measurement,
no matter how carefully designed, there is a non-vanishing residue of uncer-
tainty. In the case of spin measurements, it is thus impossible to construct a
spin measuring device that determines spin in exactly one spatial direction.
This means that the standard formal treatment of quantum measurements
using projection operators should be seen as an idealization, and that actual
laboratory measurements are better described with the help of “smeared out”
projections. In the case of spin measurements this leads to the replacement
of projection operators P~n (for spin in the exact direction ~n) by positive op-
erators E that are weighted means of projections: E(~n) =
∫
Ω
dµ(~n′)Pn′, with
µ some measure (probability) centered around the direction ~n. More gener-
ally, taking into account the approximate nature of measurements results in
a variation on the standard quantum mechanical measurement formalism in
which positive operators E, effects, take the place of projection operators.
The novel interpretative step taken by Paul Busch is to view these effects
E not merely as mathematical tools for taking into account the imprecision
of measurements on a quantum system, but also as a representation of un-
sharp properties of this quantum system itself. As he comments [2, p. 351]
“It is important to note that ‘unsharpness’ admits not only an interpreta-
tion as (subjective) measurement uncertainty but also as proper quantum
mechanical uncertainty.”
As it turns out, if the unsharpness of the quantum spin effects E(~n) and
E(~n′) increases, at a certain point these two unsharp properties will start to
admit a joint probability distribution (in spite of the fact that the projec-
tion operators P~n and P~n′ do not commute). It is therefore to be expected
that unsharp quantum properties play a role in making the classical limit of
quantum mechanics intuitively understandable: unsharpness washes out the
consequences of complementarity. Unsharpness of quantum properties also
plays an explanatory role in other contexts. For example, the unsharp posi-
tion of quantum particles makes their behavior in a double-slit experiment
fathomable.
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Paul Busch fleshed out his realist interpretation of quantum indetermi-
nacy in various later publications [3, 4, 5, 6]. In the Introduction of his review
paper with G. Jaeger, “Unsharp Quantum Reality” [7], the interesting moti-
vation of the authors for pursuing any realist research program at all is made
explicit:
[In physical practice] there is still a strong presence of the view
that Quantum Mechanics is nothing more than a formalism for
the calculation of measurement statistics...
It seems to us that a more coherent and productive approach
would be to investigate systematically all possible variants of re-
alist interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, including those in
which probabilities are not essentially epistemic. On a realist
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics as a complete theory, the
referent of quantum mechanical propositions is the individual sys-
tem. This would not only recognize the possibility that such a
philosophically realist interpretation could in the end enable the
best description of the physical world; it also has the potential
benefit of providing us with guidance in developing new, appro-
priately adapted intuitions about microphysical objects... A pri-
mary role of any realist interpretation is to provide a rule that
determines, for every state, which physical quantities have defi-
nite values in that state, thus representing “elements of reality”
or actual properties pertaining to the quantum system under in-
vestigation.
In the present paper we put forth an interpretational point of
view that has not yet been much considered but that seems to us
worthy of further exploration—the concept of unsharp quantum
reality.
We fully agree with the motivation for investigating realist interpretations
expressed in this quotation. Even though it may be unlikely that we will
ever be able to single out one such interpretation as uniquely and faithfully
describing physical reality as it is in itself, each consistent and empirically
viable realist interpretation will provide us with a picture of what the physical
world could be like and will thus enrich our conceptual repertoire and broaden
our intuitions. As stated by Busch and Jaeger, in order to go beyond mere
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measurement statistics such interpretations of quantum mechanics have to
be about physical systems and their properties.
The essential question that arises for each realist interpretation is how the
states ascribed to physical systems by quantum mechanics relate to properties
possessed by these systems; different interpretations give different answers to
this question. Busch and Jaeger also comment on this issue, and argue that
in the case of sharp properties the most plausible answer is provided by the
eigenvalue-eigenstate link1. They reason as follows:
If a property is absent, the systems action or behavior will be
different from that when it is present. Applied to the context
of a measurement, in which an observer induces an interaction
between the system and part of its environment (a measurement
apparatus), this means that if a property is actual—that is, an
observable has a definite value—then its measurement exhibits
this value or property unambiguously and (hence) with certainty.
This condition—which, incidentally, is routinely being used as a
calibration condition for measuring instruments—is taken as the
defining requirement for a measurement scheme to qualify as a
measurement of a given observable. Its implementation within
the quantum theory of measurement is possible if a propertys be-
ing actual is associated with the system being in a corresponding
eigenstate.
In summary, the structure of the quantum theory of measurement
... suggests the adoption of the eigenvalueeigenstate link as a
necessary and sufficient criterion of empirical reality in quantum
mechanics.2
The core idea of this argument is that if a perfect measurement of an
observable is made on a system possessing a sharp value of that observable,
an outcome revealing this value must be found with certainty, that is with
1It should be noted that Busch’s and Jaeger’s defense of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link
is independent of their unsharp quantum reality proposal, as emphasized by an anonymous
reviewer.
2Busch and Jaeger immediately add: “However, the application of quantum mechanics
to the description of measurement processes also leads directly into the quantum measure-
ment problem... This problem is one of the main reasons for the continued debate about
the interpretation of quantum mechanics.”
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probability 1. According to quantum mechanics this is only possible if the
system is in an eigenstate of the measured observable. This leads to the
conclusion that a system can only possess a sharp property (corresponding
to an eigenvalue of an observable) if its state is the associated eigenstate—this
is the eigenvalue-eigenstate link3.
However, there is room for alternative views concerning this issue: as
shown by non-collapse interpretations (e.g., relative-states/many-worlds in-
terpretations [8, 9], modal interpretations [10, 11], including the Bohm inter-
pretation [12]) it is possible to consistently interpret quantum mechanics in
terms of physical properties of individual systems even without subscribing
to the eigenvalue-eigenstate link. The key idea here is that it is a conceptual
possibility that the quantum state specifies epistemic probabilities for the
presence of a range of possible values of a physical quantity, even though
only one value is actually realized in any individual case (in the many-worlds
interpretation this description applies to the epistemic situation as seen from
one single branch). In spite of such a range of non-vanishing epistemic prob-
abilities, a perfect measurement may still unambiguously and faithfully re-
veal the actually present property with (conditional) probability 1. In other
words, even if the quantum state is not an eigenstate of an observable, so
that it specifies non-vanishing probabilities for several eigenvalues, it is not
a priori inconsistent to assume that an individual system is associated with
only one of these values and that this value will be revealed with certainty
in a perfect measurement. Of course, if the quantum state assigned to the
object is not an eigenstate of the measured observable, this state only allows
us to predict probabilities for a range of possible measurement outcomes, and
in repetitions of the measurement in this same state these probabilities will
materialize as approximate relative frequencies. But nevertheless the princi-
ple that a preexisting property of a system must be faithfully and certainly
reproduced by an ideal measurement can be upheld if the conditional proba-
bility for the measuring device to indicate value a, if a represents a property
of the object system, is 1. This shows that the “calibration condition” by
itself does not prove that a property can only be actual if the system is
described by the corresponding eigenstate.
Moreover, as Busch and Jaeger note in their review paper, adopting the
3The degree of sharpness (or lack thereof) of unsharp properties can then be charac-
terized via the distance between a system’s state and the eigenstate corresponding to the
sharp property.
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eigenvalue-eigenstate link has the unpleasant consequence that we have to ac-
cept the occurrence of collapses of the wave function during measurements.
Indeed, once a measurement result has become definite, the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link tells us that the system on which the measurement has taken
place must have ended up in an eigenstate of the measured observable, even
if it was in a superposition of such eigenstates before. This leads to the in-
famous measurement problem: taking collapses seriously entails recognizing
restrictions on the validity of unitary Schro¨dinger evolution, which raises a
plethora of well-known problems.
We shall therefore in the following explore an alternate route, namely ac-
knowledging the universality of unitary evolution and rejecting the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link as a necessary condition for the attribution of (sharp) prop-
erties4. As we shall see, attributing properties to systems in the context
of unitary quantum mechanics leads to an unexpected, intuitively peculiar
non-classical picture.
2 Unitary Quantum Mechanics
There are several interpretational schemes only admitting unitary evolution
and excluding collapses: the Bohm theory, consistent histories, Everett/many
worlds, and modal interpretations are examples. These schemes all start from
the basic view that the same physical principles should apply regardless of
whether we are dealing with elemental physical interactions or complicated
measurements. Measurements are accordingly treated as ordinary physical
interactions, between object systems and measuring devices. Given the huge
amount of evidence that outside the measurement context physical interac-
tions between quantum systems are governed by unitary evolution (which
leads to superpositions and entanglement), the assumption that unitary evo-
lution applies universally becomes natural once one does not assign an inde-
pendent status to measurement interactions.
Unitary schemes not only unify ordinary physical interactions and mea-
surements, but also the theoretical treatment of the micro and macro levels.
Macroscopic properties like the position of a pointer on the dial of a measur-
4The eigenvalue-eigenstate link as a sufficient condition for property attribution is
unproblematic. Which properties are to be ascribed to a system when the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link is abandoned, depends on the specific unitary interpretation that is con-
sidered.
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ing device should accordingly fall under the same rules of quantum property
ascription as microscopic properties. Even human observers should in princi-
ple be seen as very complicated quantum systems, analyzable in terms of the
physical properties they possess (including memory contents). This general
programmatic viewpoint is of course not unique to quantum physics: it gen-
eralizes physicalist ideas well known from classical physics. We mention the
point here because it will play a role in our later discussion of measurements
(and their reversal) in unitary quantum mechanics.
As discussed in the previous section, the argument that a system can
only possess a determinate value of a physical quantity when it is in the
appropriate eigenstate of the associated observable can be circumvented by
a probabilistic interpretation of the quantum state, according to which this
state provides us with probabilities for individual eigenvalues to be present.
Unitary schemes employ the usual Born probability rule for these probabili-
ties5.
A point that will play an important role later on is that the assumption of
universal validity of unitary Schro¨dinger evolution entails that all quantum
processes can in principle be reversed. Just as in classical physics any process
that goes from initial state A to final state B can be undone by a physical
interaction in the reverse direction, leading back to the initial state, the
final state in a quantum process governed by unitary interaction can also
be brought back to its initial state by applying appropriate interactions. In
particular, it is possible (in principle!) to undo a measurement: after a record
of the measurement result has been formed, an appropriate reversal of the
interactions between the elementary constituents involved in the process will
be able to restore the situation that was present before the measurement—the
record of the outcome will of course be erased during this process.
Of course, a restoration of the initial situation is also possible in schemes
in which collapses occur: after a projection that takes |Ψ〉 = Σici|ψ〉i to |ψ〉k,
there will in principle always be a unitary evolution that transforms |ψk〉
into |Ψ〉 again, since unitary transformations are rotations in Hilbert space
and any vector can be rotated into any other. The essential difference with
the unitary case becomes clear when we consider states of several systems
that are correlated, as in the EPR situation. For example, after a collapse
Σici|ψ〉1i ⊗ |ϕ〉2i ⇒ |ψ〉1k ⊗ |ϕ〉2k, as a result of a measurement on system 1,
5Often these Born probabilities are simply posited; some authors attempt to derive
them from more basic principles, e.g. [9]. For our purposes this difference is not important.
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the initial entangled state can only be reproduced via a transformation that
affects the total system, comprising both 1 and 2. By contrast, when we
assume only unitary evolution an ideal measurement on system 1 alone is
represented by a transition of the form
Σici|ψ〉1i ⊗ |ϕ〉2i ⊗ |E〉0 ⇒ Σici|ψ〉1i ⊗ |ϕ〉2i ⊗ |E〉i,
in which |E〉i and |E〉0 are states of a measuring device interacting solely
with system 1. This transition can be reversed by locally acting on system
1 and its measuring device; no interaction with system 2 is needed. For the
case of EPR experiments on space-like separated systems this implies that
the effects of a local measurement on system 1 can also be undone locally,
by interactions with 1: the total state, including system 2, can be brought
back to what it initially was without touching system 2 (something that is
impossible in the case of collapses).
3 Unitarity and Relativity
Unitary interpretations as defined in the preceding section are known to
face problems with Lorentz invariance (e.g., [13, 14, 15]). The nature of the
difficulty has recently been illustrated in a simple way by Gao [16]. In Gao’s
thought experiment two observers, Alice and Bob, are located at space-like
separation from each other and perform spin measurements on an EPR pair
of electrons in the singlet state (the usual Bohm-EPR setup). Let us assume
that Alice and Bob both measure spin in the same direction, so that quantum
mechanics predicts that their outcomes will be anti-correlated.
As we have seen a moment ago, unitary quantum mechanics permits the
local reversal of such measurements, which restores the original two-particle
singlet state. This can be used to construct a paradoxical variation on the
usual Bohm-EPR thought experiment.
Let Alice measure the spin of her particle and let her record (or memorize)
the outcome—we may think of Alice as fulfilling the role of the measuring
device in the discussion at the end of section 2. After Alice’s measurement a
unitary restoration process takes place that locally undoes the measurement
and returns Alice and Bob plus the two particles to their original total state
(so that Alice loses all her information about the outcome). Finally, Bob
measures the spin of his particle in the same direction in which Alice had
measured before.
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Let us call the inertial frame in which the just-given description of the
experiment applies the laboratory frame. When we apply the standard quan-
tum mechanical rules in this frame, we predict that Alice records either +1
or −1 as her result, both possibilities having probability 1/2. Alice’s record
is erased in the subsequent anti-measurement, after which Bob performs his
measurement in the original singlet state so that he also finds either +1 or
−1, again with probability 1/2 for each possible result.
However, because Alice and Bob are space-like separated, there exists
another inertial frame of reference with a simultaneity relation such that in
this frame Alice measures her electron first, then Bob measures his electron,
and finally Alice’s measurement is undone only after both measurements
have taken place.
This leads to the following problem. In the second frame, in which Alice’s
experiment is undone as the final step, Bob’s measurement must yield −1
if Alice’s result was +1, because of the anti-correlation in the singlet state:
the conditional probability of Bob’s outcome being −1 is 1, given Alice’s
result. As we have seen, however, in the laboratory frame Alice’s result no
longer exists when Bob performs his measurement, since Alice’s measurement
has been undone at that instant and the original Bohm-EPR state has been
restored. Consequently, according to the usual quantum mechanical rules
applied in the laboratory frame Bob’s result does not need to be −1 even if
Alice’s result was +1; Bob may alternatively find −1, with probability 1/2.
The consequence is that in a long series of repetitions of this “EPR plus
restoration” experiment, after selection6 of all cases in which Alice’s experi-
ment yields +1, we have to expect that Bob finds−1 and +1 in approximately
half of the cases according to quantum mechanics applied in the laboratory
frame, but always −1 according to quantum mechanics in the other frame.
We may construct a variation on this thought experiment in which we
do not need a series of repetitions with new EPR pairs, but use the same
electrons over and over again. Suppose that when Alice’s experiment has
been undone (as seen from the laboratory frame), and Bob has completed his
measurement, Bob’s measurement is undone as well, after which he performs
a second measurement. This second measurement can be reversed in its turn,
after which a third measurement can be done; and so on. If the space-time
distance between Alice and Bob and the time scales of Bob’s measurements
6That is, selection in abstracto, with the mind’s eye. Any real physical selection would
involve an interaction that would spoil the perfect reversal of Alice’s measurement.
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are judiciously chosen the experiment can be arranged in such a way that
all Bob’s measurement take place before Alice’s measurement is undone,
according to the simultaneity in some other inertial frame. In this way we
arrive at the same paradox as before: In the lab frame quantum mechanics
tells us that approximately half of Bob’s results will be−1 if Alice’s result was
+1, in the other frame the quantum prediction is that all of Bob’s outcomes
must be the same, namely −1.
In both cases we arrive at a contradiction, which suggests that the unitary
formalism of quantum mechanics cannot be used for making predictions in
the same way in all inertial frames.
One way of responding to this is to posit that there exists a preferred
inertial frame, whose simultaneity is the only one to be used when predict-
ing outcomes and their frequencies with the standard formalism of quantum
mechanics. This is the route taken by the Bohm theory—that the Bohm
theory faces problems with special relativity and cannot accept the equiva-
lence of all inertial reference frames has long been recognized because of the
occurrence of instantaneous interactions in that theory. It is interesting to
discuss in some more detail how the Bohm theory deals with the new thought
experiment, and to compare it with other unitary schemes.
According to the Bohm theory the complete state of a system of two spin-
1
2
particles is given by its wave function plus the individual positions of the
two particles. We consider here the standard version of the theory according
to which the particles do not possess an intrinsic spin—their only physical
property is position. However, the wave function is taken to be the usual
spinor-valued one (in our case with the singlet state as its spin part) and the
Hamiltonian governing the evolution of the wave function contains the usual
coupling between spin variables and magnetic fields. In the interaction with
a Stern-Gerlach device the spatial wave function will therefore be split into
two parts, an upper and a lower wave packet. The initial positions of the
particles, in their initial wave packets, determine whether they will end up in
the upper or the lower wave packet on their wing of the experiment. In this
way the final position of a particle, after the interaction with a Stern-Gerlach
device, represents the result of a “spin measurement” even though the Bohm
theory does not operate with an intrinsic spin property. The result of the spin
measurement is either “up” or “down”. Because of the non-local interaction
between the particles (due to the entanglement of the total state), particle 2
will be driven down when particle 1 is the first to interact with the magnetic
field of the Stern-Gerlach device and goes up; and vice versa when particle
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2 is the first to interact (see [17] for a detailed discussion).
In the initial stage of our thought experiment there is one spatial wave
packet near Alice and one near Bob. Let us suppose that both Alice’s and
Bob’s particle find themselves in initial positions such that they will emerge
“up” (spin result +1) when they are the first to interact with their respective
Stern-Gerlach devices (the particle that is second to interact will go opposite
to the other one, so that its spin outcome will be −1 and the anti-correlation
between the spin results predicted by quantum mechanics is reproduced).
In repetitions of the experiment with new pairs of electrons there will be a
probability of 1/2 for each electron to be in an initial position, in its own
wave packet, that leads to the result “up”7.
Suppose that as judged from the laboratory frame Alice makes her mea-
surement first and finds +1, after which a reverse local evolution takes place
that restores the initial wave function, returns Alice’s particle to its origi-
nal position, and erases Alice’s result. Then Bob measures the spin of his
particle and also finds +1, the outcome deterministically determined by his
particle’s initial position. In a long series of repetitions of the experiment,
each time with a new pair of electrons, and collecting (in thought!) all runs
in which Alice’s outcome is +1, the Bohm prediction is that Bob will find
both instances of +1 and of −1, each of these outcomes in approximately
50% of the cases—in the Bohm theory it is supposed that in repetitions of
the experiment the initial particle positions will be distributed according to
the Born rule. By contrast, if Bob’s measurement is repeated many times
with the same particle, each time undoing the measurement and restarting
from the same initial situation, the Bohm prediction is that the same result
(+1) will be found in each run of the experiment.
When we now consider these three versions of the experiment from the
other inertial frame, in which Bob’s measurements take place before Alice’s
measurement is undone, we find the following. In the single-run experiment
Alice finds +1 and Bob −1, because the non-local influence of Alice’s result
sends Bob’s particle “down”. When the experiment is repeated many times
with new particle pairs, and Alice’s +1 cases are collected, Bob will in all
cases measure −1. If the experiment is done repeatedly with one particle
7From this description one already sees why the notion of a preferred frame imposes
itself in the Bohm theory: if Alice and Bob are at space-like separation from each other,
the time order of their spin measurements will generally be frame-dependent. In this case,
application of quantum mechanics in the same way in all frames leads to contradictory
predictions for the measurement outcomes.
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pair, as described before, Bob will also find −1 each time.
Clearly, the predictions from the two frames of reference contradict each
other in all three versions of the experiment. This further supports the
necessity of a privileged frame in Bohm’s theory.
Let us now consider the same experiments from the perspective of non-
Bohmian unitary quantum mechanics (i.e., unitary schemes that do not as-
sume that position is a preferred observable [12]). According to the standard
quantum rules applied in the lab frame, Alice will find either +1 or −1, both
with probability 1/2. Let us again focus on the case with outcome 1, in order
to compare with the predictions of the Bohm theory. After the reversal of
Alice’s measurement Bob finds either +1 or −1, with equal probabilities. In
a long series of experiments, with many pairs of particles, we find that Bob’s
results are 50% up and 50% down. If Bob’s experiment is repeated by means
of reversals we also find a 50%− 50% distribution.
There is therefore a difference with the Bohm prediction for the third
version of the experiment. Because of its determinism, the Bohm scheme
predicts that repetitions of an experiment with exactly the same initial condi-
tions will lead to exactly the same outcomes. But since the initial conditions
in non-Bohmian quantum mechanics do not involve particle positions, this
Bohm result cannot be carried over to the standard theory. So it might seem
that we have a situation where we could, in principle, empirically distinguish
between the Bohm theory and standard quantum mechanics. This is decep-
tive, however: because Bob’s measurements are each time undone, no records
of them can exist and no empirical comparison of their outcomes is possible.
Whether or not there is a correlation between the results of repeated mea-
surements on the same system, with reversals between the measurements, is
something that as a matter of principle cannot be verified or refuted empir-
ically.
When the second frame of reference is used to describe the three versions
of the EPR-plus-reversal experiment with non-Bohmian unitary quantum
mechanics, we find that Bob measures−1 if Alice’s result is +1. In repetitions
with new particle pairs Bob will also always find −1 in the cases in which
Alice measured +1. Finally, when Bob’s measurements are repeated on the
same particle he will still find −1 in all cases.
Non-Bohmian quantum mechanics, applied in the second frame, thus
yields the same predictions as Bohm’s theory: the +1 result of Alice fixes
Bob’s outcome as −1 in all cases. Again, the predictions from frame 2 run
counter to what is predicted from the laboratory frame. In the first ver-
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sion of the experiment (one single measurement by both Alice and Bob) the
probability of Bob finding −1 is 1/2 in the lab frame instead of 1 (the latter
probability value is predicted in the other frame). Although this is not an
direct contradiction in terms of measurement results, it becomes so in the
second and third versions of the experiment in which the probability is made
into an approximate frequency.
Given that the Bohm theory has already developed a tool to protect it-
self against relativistic inconsistencies, namely the postulation of a privileged
reference frame with respect to which the non-local quantum interactions are
defined, it seems only natural to take over this recipe for unitary interpre-
tations in general. It is true that assuming the existence of such a frame is
at odds with Einstein’s first special relativistic postulate; but it has often
been argued that this objection is not decisive because quantum mechan-
ics contains an element of non-locality and therefore is at odds with special
relativity anyway.
However, it is possible to interpret this non-locality of quantum mechanics
in a way that does not involve superluminal causation or action-at-a-distance,
and does not conflict with relativity. A key to this alternative viewpoint is
the observation that physical systems as described by quantum mechanics are
generally not space-time objects in the way classical systems are. As we shall
argue, this observation may be used as a starting point for the construction
of a new scheme for reconciling quantum mechanics, and the above thought
experiments, with relativity—even though the ensuing alternative solution
of the inconsistency problems will require a break with a number of classical
intuitions.
4 Perspectives and Non-Locality
According to classical physics physical systems can be analyzed as built up
from local parts, each part possessing its own locally defined properties.
Specification of all these local parts and their properties provides us with
the complete instantaneous state of a classical system as a whole. For ex-
ample, a measuring rod is described as a collection of very many particles
whose instantaneous local properties together determine the properties of the
composite system. A classical field in a spatial region is likewise completely
specified by the local field strengths at all points in that region.
The formalism of quantum mechanics suggests a different picture, though.
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This is because in general many-particle states are entangled, and such entan-
gled states are not combinations of one-particle states that specify complete
sets of one-particle properties. The Bohm-EPR two-electron singlet state
furnishes a typical example. This state is the product of a symmetric spatial
part and an anti-symmetric spin part
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
{|L〉1|R〉2 + |R〉1|L〉2} ⊗ {|↑〉1| ↓〉2 − |↓〉1| ↑〉2}, (1)
where |L〉 and |R〉 correspond to narrow wave packets localized on the left
and right wing of the EPR experiment, respectively. If one were to think
of the EPR experiment as pertaining to two particles, each one with its
own complete set of spatial and spin properties, one would expect the total
state to be built up from the one-electron states |L〉1| ↑〉1, |L〉1| ↓〉1, |R〉2| ↑〉2
and |R〉2| ↓〉2, in each of which a full set of particle properties is specified
(namely a definite spin plus a localization property). Instead, however, we
find that in Eq.(1) the global spatial features of the two-particle system
and its global spin properties are independently combined, i.e. without a
correlation between individual particle localization and individual spin.
In fact, the indices 1 and 2, usually taken to be particle labels, are not
correlated to either |L〉 or |R〉 so that in state (1) we cannot even speak
about particle 1 as being at the left-hand side and particle 2 at the right-
hand side, or vice versa. As argued in [18, 19, 20] this shows that the standard
interpretation of state (1) in physical practice, namely as representing two
particles at a large distance from each other, one on the left and one on
the right, implicitly renounces the doctrine that the indices 1 and 2 label
these particles. Rather, in physical practice the individual constituents of
the total system are taken to correspond directly to the two spatial one-
particle states |L〉 and |R〉 (L referring to the left particle and R to the right
one). However, even with this understanding there is no correlation between
spatial properties and definite spin directions, so that we still cannot think
in terms of a particle on the left possessing its own definite spin and a similar
particle on the right. Instead, Eq.(1) represents a system with a global spin
property that is uncorrelated to its localization properties.
In other words, the classical paradigm according to which a system con-
sists of independently defined local parts does not fit in in a natural way with
how quantum mechanics generally describes physical systems. As argued in
[20, 21], violations of Bell inequalities can accordingly be viewed as evidence
that a classical “local parts picture” does not apply—instead of the more
14
common interpretation that such violations are manifestations of non-local
interactions or influences between distant parts.
In order to fix the properties of a two-particle system in an entangled
quantum state like (1) we therefore need to specify its total, global state,
which cannot be written as a concatenation of local states or as the combi-
nation of two one-particle states. In the case of a spatially extended system
as in (1) the specification of the total state must involve the identification of
a hyperplane of simultaneity, or more generally a space-like hypersurface, on
which the state is defined. Different choices of such hyperplanes will generally
lead to different property attributions (cf. [22]). The thought experiment of
section 3 provides us with an example: the laboratory frame and the other
inertial frame considered there define alternative hyperplanes of simultaneity
on which the global states of the system are different. On one hyperplane the
total state is correlated to a state of Alice’s measuring device corresponding
to a definite outcome, whereas there is no such correlation on other hyper-
planes. It cannot be excluded a priori that this leads to differences in the
description even locally at points where the two hyperplanes intersect, in
particular at Bob’s position.
What we accordingly propose as an interpretative option is that the phys-
ical characteristics of what happens in Bob’s measurements not only depend
on the local circumstances near Bob, but also on the total state that deter-
mines the properties of the system that is being measured and thus on the
hyperplane on which that state is defined. If the global state is different on
different hyperplanes, the properties of the global system will generally be
different as well so that Bob as described on different hyperplanes will be
involved in measurements of different properties.
What we are suggesting here is the attribution of hyperplane dependent,
and in this sense perspectival properties. The idea of perspectivalism is not
new: see for example [23, 24, 25, 26]. These earlier proposals discuss property
attributions to a system from different perspectives connected to different ob-
servers (who stand in different relations to the system depending on whether
or not they have interacted with it). The present proposal is even more rad-
ical because it contemplates the possibility that the same observer measures
different outcomes depending on the hyperplane on which the measurement
is described (see, however, [27] for arguments that hyperplane dependence is
not as radical as it seems).
A comment that may come to mind is that hyperplane dependence is
something already well known from special relativity. However, although it
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is true that in special relativity different frames of reference are associated
with different descriptions of physical processes, these descriptions relate to
each other via Lorentz transformations that translate between states of affairs
defined point by point. These Lorentz transformations will never translate an
outcome +1 (the event of a pointer indicating +1 on a dial) in one frame of
reference into the outcome −1 in another frame. The hyperplane dependence
that we are discussing here goes further than this special relativistic frame
dependence. The non-quantum special relativistic picture is still based on the
principle that physical systems and processes are built up from independently
existing locally defined events. But in the quantum mechanical formalism of
many-particle systems physical properties are not specified per point. The
resulting hyperplane dependence is different from what is at issue in special
relativity with its point-by-point Lorentz transformations8.
5 Uniqueness of Outcomes
According to this perspectivalist proposal there may be a difference between
Bob’s outcome in relation to Alice having made a not yet undone measure-
ment and with respect to Alice after her measurement has been undone.
Evidently, this conflicts with the intuition that it cannot make any difference
for Bob’s local situation what happens far away—the locality notion that
underlies relativity and the EPR argument. As pointed out before, this in-
tuition depends on the idea that any global system consists of spatial parts,
each with its independently defined properties—a notion of which we have
seen that it does not sit well with the mathematical structure of quantum
mechanics.
But, it may be objected, perhaps Bob is not aware that Alice is perform-
ing measurements far away, or does not even know that the system on which
he is making his measurement has a distant counterpart. Surely, Bob will
find one definite result completely independently of such considerations? All
our experience indicates that any successful experiment has only one definite
result. Can this be reconciled with the idea that Bob’s results are perspecti-
val?
The uniqueness of direct experience is not in conflict with perspectivalism,
8That many-component systems are defined globally rather than point by point is also
important for the covariance properties of wave function collapse construed as an effective
description within unitary quantum mechanics [22].
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because in each perspective there is only one unique and definite measure-
ment result. But it is true that there is a multiplicity of outcomes corre-
sponding to different perspectives. This is reminiscent of the many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which there are many branches, each
with its own unique state of affairs. But although there is this similarity with
the many-worlds account, there are also important differences.
In relativistic many-worlds branching [28], Bob’s local measurement in-
duces a local splitting of worlds so that each possible spin plus position
outcome is instantiated in one of the resulting branches. This splitting then
propagates through the universe, with a velocity less than or equal to the
velocity of light. This account retains the classical notion of locality: the
branching events arising from Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are localized
at Alice’s and Bob’s positions and the branching propagates like a wave
through space-time.
By contrast, in the perspectival account discussed here there is no lo-
cal propagation of different possibilities (branches) but two different states
of affairs as defined on two different global hyperplanes. Moreover, in our
account not all possible results need to be instantiated. After one pair of
measurements by Alice and Bob, Alice’s spin outcome may be +1 and Bob’s
outcome −1, from all perspectives; this is a globally consistent possibility.
It is true that in repetitions of Bob’s measurement the outcome +1 will also
occur, namely with respect to hyperplanes on which Alice’s measurement has
been undone. This is not the consequence of a splitting of the world, how-
ever. It takes place in the same world as before, although along a different
hyperplane from the one on which the outcome −1 is instantiated.
So there is a multiplicity of outcomes in a quite specific and limited sense,
namely relating to different perspectives defined by different hyperplanes,
all occurring in one single world. This restricted multiplicity is sufficient
to avoid a number of no-go results that may seem to show that quantum
experiments cannot have unique outcomes in a stronger sense, and that even
the objectivity and consistency of quantum theory are under threat [29, 30,
31].
6 Perspectives and Contextuality
A recent example of such no-go arguments was recently discussed by Healey,
who credits its idea to Masanes [31]. As in the thought experiment discussed
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in section 3, Alice and Bob (who find themselves at space-like separation from
each other) share a Bohm-EPR pair of spin-1
2
particles and each of them is set
to perform a spin measurement, in directions ~a and~b, respectively. In the new
experiment there are also two colleagues of Alice and Bob, Carol and Dan,
with their own measuring devices; Carol finds herself close to Alice, Dan is
located near to Bob. Carol and Dan are set to make spin measurements in the
respective directions ~c and ~d. As in the earlier experiment, it is supposed that
measurements can be undone by local operations, as permitted by unitary
quantum mechanics; Alice and Bob are assumed to possess the means to
locally reverse the measurements made by Carol and Dan, respectively.
Measurement are now made in the following way and order. First Dan
measures the spin of the particle near to him in the ~d direction, then Carol
performs a measurement on her particle, in the ~c direction. Subsequently,
Alice undoes Carol’s measurement and performs her own measurement in
the ~a direction. Because Carol’s measurement has been undone, the state
of the particle system plus Dan is the same for Alice, when she does her
measurement, as it was for Carol when she did hers. Finally, Bob undoes
Dan’s measurement and measures in the ~b direction himself.
So in the final situation measurements have been made in the four direc-
tions ~a,~b,~c and ~d on one and the same Bohm-EPR pair. This distinguishes
the present thought experiment from standard EPR-type experiments: in
the standard cases Alice measures in her direction and Bob in his, and the
experiment has to be repeated with other particle pairs in order to make
measurements in other directions.
In the lab frame in which the four experimenters are at rest the corre-
lations between the outcomes found by Dan and Carol, Alice and Dan, and
by Alice and Bob, respectively, can be directly calculated from the standard
formula − cos(θ), with θ standing for the angle between the directions in
which the two parties involved have measured their spin values. The corre-
lation between the results of Bob and Carol cannot be calculated this way in
the laboratory frame, because Carol’s result has already been erased when
Bob performs his measurement. But this complication can be circumvented
by a maneuver that is reminiscent of the earlier thought experiment: there
exists another inertial frame in which Bob, who is at space-like separation
from Alice and Carol, makes his measurement before Alice reverses Carol’s
measurement and performs her own. In this frame, the correlation between
the outcomes found by Carol and by Bob can again be calculated by means
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of the standard formula − cos(θ).
Now, if we assume that all four measurements have outcomes that are
perspective-independent, we have in a single run of the experiment the four
jointly existing results a, b, c and d. In repetitions of the experiment there will
in this case be a probability distribution over these values. This is exactly the
familiar situation in which a Bell inequality can be derived: the values a, b, c
and d play the role of the local hidden variables that are assumed to exist in
the standard Bell derivation. But the correlations between the measurement
outcomes, as predicted by quantum mechanics in the way just explained,
violate that Bell inequality if the directions ~a,~b,~c and ~d are appropriately
chosen.
The assumption that the outcomes of the four measurements in a single
run of the above experiment can be represented by unique numbers a, b, c and
d that possess a joint probability distribution thus leads to a contradiction9.
The inconsistency disappears if we introduce context-dependence: in that
case the outcome of Carol’s measurement in the context of Dan’s result may
be different from Carol’s outcome in the context of Bob’s result. This solution
accords with our proposal in section 4: hyperplanes connecting Bob’s and
Carol’s measurements are different from hyperplanes connecting the mea-
surements by Dan and Carol, and the perspectivalism explained earlier tells
us that in this case Carol’s result need not be the same on these two hyper-
planes.
The just-discussed thought experiment, in which there is a conflict with
Bell inequalities, sheds additional light on the status of quantum perspecti-
valism. An often-heard comment on violations of Bell inequalities is that they
signal the presence of a non-local influence between distant events: different
choices of the direction in which to measure a spin value at one position
apparently make a difference for values of quantities far-away. But in the
variation on the EPR setup with four experimenters and reversals of mea-
surements, there are no choices to be made: all measurement directions are
instantiated together and fixed in each run of the experiment. Consequently,
an interpretation in terms of superluminal influences due to distant choices
9This contradiction is confirmed in an interesting way by a calculation of Gao’s [32],
who notes that if a joint distribution of a, b, c and d exists, the joint distribution of b and c
is completely fixed by the joint distributions of c and d, a and d, and a and b, respectively.
Direct calculation, using the quantum predictions for the latter three joint distributions,
demonstrates that the thus found joint distribution of b and c does not agree with what
quantum mechanics predicts for it.
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is ruled out. The role of such non-local influences in avoiding violations of
Bell inequalities is taken over by the perspectival nature of the measure-
ment outcomes: it is not the case that different choices of directions at Bob’s
and Dan’s locations change something at Carol’s position. Rather, Carol’s
physical quantities are differently defined with respect to Bob’s and Dan’s
results.
This is basically a case of contextuality : the physical quantity measured
by Alice is different in the context of Bob’s measurement from what it is in
the context of Dan’s measurement. It is well known that contextuality of this
sort is an essential feature of quantum mechanics, as proved by the Kochen
and Specker theorem. This same contextuality can be identified as the basis
of the violation of Bell inequalities (cf., e.g., [33]). Indeed, the incompat-
ibility in the Bohm-EPR experiment between quantum mechanics and the
joint existence of values of the four possible measurement results does not
depend at all on the mutual distance between the parts of the system: it per-
sists in exactly the same way when there is no appreciable distance between
them. The consideration of great distances between the partial systems only
serves to bring out the strange consequences of a “classical” interpretation
of this contextuality in terms of causal influences: if separations become
space-like, such influences have to be superluminal or even instantaneous.
What the perspectivalism proposal does is to replace all such talk about in-
fluences, causality and propagation speeds by the idea that a context—or
perspective—is needed to define the value of a physical quantity, in accor-
dance with the core of the Kochen and Specker results (and, one might add,
of certain old Bohrian ideas).
In some more technical detail, the Kochen and Specker theorem demon-
strates that if we want to assign a value to a physical quantity of a part
of a composite system represented by an operator A, we have to take into
account the rest of the total system, in the following sense. It makes a dif-
ference whether A is considered as a function of A ⊗ B or of A ⊗ C, where
B and C are observables of the rest of the system that do not commute with
each other. The Kochen and Specker theorem shows that the assumption
that A can be assigned one and the same value in all such combinations with
observables of the remainder of the system leads to a contradiction. This re-
sult is based on the structure of the algebra of observables in Hilbert space,
and holds independently of any consideration of the distance between the
systems to which A, and B,C, pertain. The perspectivalism that we have
discussed is in line with this: physical quantities are generally defined with
20
respect to quantities in other systems, which in the specific case of spatially
extended systems may be expressed as hyperplane dependence10.
7 Conclusion: Unitary Quantum Mechanics
and Covariance
Unitary quantum mechanics faces a difficulty with relativistic covariance if it
is interpreted in terms of space-time events that are characterized by locally
defined properties: it can be rigorously proved that no unitary scheme that
provides such a local account can satisfy the requirement that the same
probability rules apply equally to all hyperplanes in Minkowski space-time
[13, 14, 15].
The core premise in these proofs is that intersecting hyperplanes should
carry local properties in a coherent way, so that they provide agreeing de-
scriptions of the physical conditions at the space-time points where they
intersect. The proofs demonstrate that this local meshing of hyperplanes is
impossible, if the Born probability rule is to be valid on all hyperplanes.
One way of responding to this situation is to introduce a privileged inertial
frame of reference. This is the course taken by the Bohm theory, according to
which the Born rule only holds in the preferred frame. This is a consistent and
empirically viable way out of the problem; but still, there is a tension with the
spirit of special relativity. Indeed, Einstein in 1905 made the equivalence of
inertial frames a fundamental principle of his theory in order to theoretically
express the empirical fact that measurement results do not provide evidence
for a privileged role of any particular frame. This motivation for the first
postulate keeps its force also in quantum mechanics: the empirical predictions
of quantum mechanics, even in the Bohm interpretation, are such that they
make any assumed preferred frame undetectable.
It is therefore worth-while to ask whether there exist other options for
escaping the no-go theorems. The answer is affirmative: such a possibility
has in fact been outlined in the foregoing sections. Indeed, as we have seen,
the crucial assumption in the no-go theorems is that properties of physical
systems are monadic, in the sense of independent of the presence of other
10Of course, this perspectivalism or hyperplane dependence becomes significant only
in the case of entangled states. If the total state is a product state, or if the effects of
entanglement are washed out by a decohering environment, monadic, non-perspectival
properties can be ascribed to the two partial systems without contradiction.
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systems and locally defined independently of the hyperplane on which they
are considered. This assumption is rejected in interpretations that work with
perspectival and hyperplane dependent properties. In these interpretations
physical properties are defined per hyperplane, in a way that is relativistically
covariant.
Unlike the proposal to accept the existence of a privileged inertial system,
the idea to accept that physical properties are perspectival is not ad hoc, be-
cause it addresses more questions than merely the lack of Lorentz invariance
and fits in naturally with the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics.
In particular, as argued in section 6, it may be seen as an expression of the
contextuality that the Bell, and Kochen and Specker, results have shown to
be central to quantum theory.
Accepting that physical properties are not monadic and locally defined,
but rather perspectival, relational and hyperplane dependent is a huge step
away from everyday experience and from the intuitions that served us well
in non-quantum physics. But it constitutes a broadening of our conceptual
repertoire of exactly the kind that Paul Busch envisaged as a benefit of
investigating realist interpretations of quantum mechanics.
References
[1] Busch, P.: Can quantum theoretical reality be considered sharp?
In: Mittelstaedt, P. and Stachow, E.W. (eds.) Recent Developments
in Quantum Logic, pp. 81-101. Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim
(1985)
[2] Busch, P.: Elements of unsharp reality in the EPR experiment. In:
Lahti, P. and Mittelstaedt, P. (eds.) Symposium on the Foundations of
Modern Physics—50 years of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Gedanken-
experiment, pp. 343-367. World Scientific, Singapore (1985)
[3] Busch, P.: Unsharp reality and joint measurements for spin observables,
Physical Review D 33, 2253-2261 (1986)
[4] Busch, P.: Remarks on unsharp quantum observables, objectification,
and modal interpretations. In: Dieks, D. and Vermaas, P. (eds.) The
Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, pp. 279-288. Kluwer, Dor-
drecht (1998)
22
[5] Busch, P.: Unsharp localization and causality in relativistic quantum
theory, Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General 32, 6535-6546
(1999)
[6] Busch, P.: EPR-Bell tests with unsharp observables and relativistic
quantum measurement. In: Placek T., Butterfield J. (eds.) Non-locality
and Modality. NATO Science Series (Series II: Mathematics, Physics
and Chemistry), vol 64, pp. 175-193. Springer, Dordrecht (2002)
[7] Busch, P. and Jaeger, G.: Unsharp quantum reality, Foundations of
Physics 40, 1341-1367 (2010)
[8] Everett H.: “Relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics, Re-
views of Modern Physics 29, 454-462 (1957)
[9] Wallace, D.: The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory According to
the Everett Interpretation. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2012)
[10] Dieks, D. and Vermaas, P. The Modal Interpretation of Quantum Me-
chanics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1998)
[11] Lombardi, O. and Dieks, D. Modal interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics. In: Zalta E.N. (ed.),The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2017 Edition. URL =
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/qm-modal/ (2017)
[12] Bub, J.: Interpreting the Quantum World. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1997)
[13] Berndl, K., Du¨r, D., Goldstein, S, and Zanghi, N. Nonlocality, Lorentz
invariance, and Bohmian quantum theory, Physical Review A 53, 2062-
2073 (1996)
[14] Dickson, M. and Clifton, R.: Lorentz invariance in modal interpreta-
tions, In: [10], pp. 9-47 (1998)
[15] Myrvold, W.: Modal interpretations and relativity, Foundations of
Physics 32, 1773-1784 (2002)
[16] Gao, S.: Unitary quantum theories are incompatible with special rela-
tivity, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15357/ (2018)
23
[17] Norsen, T.: The pilot-wave perspective on spin, American Journal of
Physics 82, 337-348 (2014)
[18] Dieks, D., and Lubberdink, A.: How classical particles emerge from the
quantum world. Foundations of Physics 41, 1051-1064 (2011)
[19] Dieks, D.: Quantum information and locality. In: Lombardi, O. et al.
(eds.), What is Quantum Information?, pp. 93-112. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge (2017)
[20] Dieks, D. and Lubberdink, A. Identical quantum particles as distin-
guishable objects. arXiv:1902.09280 [quant-ph] (2019)
[21] Dieks, D.: Quantum mechanics and perspectivalism. arXiv:1801.09307
[physics.hist-ph]. To appear in: Lombardi, O. et al. (eds.), Quantum
Worlds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2019)
[22] Dieks, D.: On the covariant description of wavefunction collapse. Physics
Letters 108A, 379-383 (1985)
[23] Rovelli, C.: Relational quantum mechanics. International Journal of
Theoretical Physics 35, 1637-1678 (1996)
[24] Bene, G. and Dieks, D.: A perspectival version of the modal interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics and the origin of macroscopic behavior.
Foundations of Physics 32, 645-671 (2002)
[25] Dieks, D.: Objectivity in perspective: Relationism in the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Foundations of Physics 39, 760-775 (2009)
[26] Laudisa, F. and Rovelli, C.: Relational quantum me-
chanics. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition). URL =
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/qm-relational/
(2013)
[27] Fleming, G.: Just how radical is hyperplane dependence? In: R. Clifton
(ed.), Perspectives on Quantum Reality, pp. 11-28. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht (1996)
24
[28] Bacciagaluppi G.: Remarks on space-time and locality in Everetts inter-
pretation. In: Placek T., Butterfield J. (eds.) Non-locality and Modality.
NATO Science Series (Series II: Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry),
vol 64. Springer, Dordrecht (2002)
[29] Frauchiger, D. and Renner, R.: Single-world interpretations of quantum
theory cannot be self-consistent. arXiv:1604.07422v1 [quant-ph] (2016)
[30] Bub, J.: Why Bohr was (mostly) right. arXiv:1711.01604v1 [quant-ph]
(2017)
[31] Healey, R.: Quantum theory and the limits of objectivity, Foundations
of Physics 48, 1568-1589 (2018)
[32] Gao, S.: Are there limits of objectivity in the quantum world?
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15373/ (2018)
[33] Mermin, N.D.: Hidden variables and the two theorems of John Bell.
Reviews of Modern Physics 65, 803-815 (1993)
25
